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ABSTRACT 
Education, Redistributive Taxation and Confidence  
by Kai A. Konrad and Amedeo Spadaro * 
We consider redistributional taxation between people with and without human 
capital if education is endogenous and if individuals differ in their perceptions 
about own ability. Those who see their ability as low like redistributive taxation 
because of the transfers it generates. Those who see their ability as high may 
also like redistributive taxation because it stops other people receiving 
education and increases the quasi rents on their own human capital. It is 
surprising that this rather indirect effect can overcompensate them for the 
income loss from taxation and make the overconfident want higher taxes than 
the less confident do. The results, however, turn out to be in line with empirical 
evidence on the desired amount of redistribution among young individuals.  
 
Keywords: Education, redistribution, confidence   
JEL Classification: D78, H23, I21 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Bildung, Steuerumverteilung und Vertrauen  
Betrachtet wird die Steuerumverteilung zwischen Individuen mit hohem und 
niedrigem Ausbildungsstand, wobei angenommen wird, dass Bildung endogen 
ist und die Individuen unterschiedliche Wahrnehmungen über ihre eigenen 
Fähigkeiten haben. Diejenigen, die ihre Fähigkeiten niedrig einschätzen bevor-
zugen eine Steuerumverteilung, da durch sie eine (Vermögens-)Übertragung 
erzeugt wird. Diejenigen, die ihre Fähigkeiten sehr hoch einschätzen 
bevorzugen ebenfalls eine Steuerumverteilung, da hierdurch andere Individuen 
davon abgehalten werden, Bildung zu erwerben und somit die Quasi-Rechte 
der ersteren aus ihrer Ausbildung erhöht werden. Dieser indirekte Effekt kann 
den Einkommensverlust durch Steuern überkompensieren. Die Best-
ausgebildesten fordern sogar höhere Steuern als die Individuen mit niedrigerem 
Bildungsniveau. Die Ergebnisse entsprechen den empirisch beobachteten 
gewünschten Umverteilungsbeträgen unter jungen Individuen. 
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1 Introduction
A common theme in life and in literature suggests that people are leftist,
socialist, even communist, or at least have strong egalitarian redistributional
preferences when they are young, and as they grow older they tend to be-
come conservative, particularly if their professional career had been success-
ful. This shift in redistributional preferences is often attributed to the change
in income position and its variability. As has been pointed out by Sinn (1995),
young people face a situation in which future income is uncertain and which
they cannot fully control. These people may want future redistributional
taxation as a means of insurance, but, once their own position in the in-
come distribution has been determined, the demand for redistribution that
stems from the insurance motive disappears. Piketty (1995) emphasizes the
importance of mobility experience for redistributional preferences: mobility
experience may be related to perceptions about the incentive cost of redistri-
bution and may account for diﬀerences in redistribution in diﬀerent countries.
Income dynamics and social mobility also play a major role in a number of
analyses that consider redistributional preferences and voting outcomes on
redistributive taxation. Individuals who expect a major change in their in-
come will take this into consideration when expressing their attitudes about
governmental income redistribution.1
Ravallion and Lokshin (2000), who consider the Russian situation, find
that own expectations about own future welfare are very relevant for redis-
tributional preferences. Empirically, high current income makes individuals
favor less redistribution (see, e.g., Fong 2001, Piketty 1995, 1999, Gilens
1999, p.51, or Kluegel and Smith 1986). This is a result that is robust with
respect to the addition of socio-demographic characteristics. However, other
variables also matter, and these can considerably reduce the share that in-
come contributes to redistributional preferences (Piketty 1999). One aspect is
whether individuals think that success is determined by luck or is the reward
for personal eﬀort. This, and some further aspects that motivate attitudes
towards redistribution, are surveyed and analysed empirically in Fong (2001).
1Two papers analysing some of these aspects are Glazer and Konrad (1994) and Bén-
abou and Ok (2001). Glazer and Konrad (1994) show that rich people may want to live
in a neighborhood where a persistent majority of poor makes sure there will also be some
redistribution of income in the future if there is some risk that they themselves will become
poor then. Bénabou and Ok (2001) show that the "prospect of upward mobility" may
yield a political majority that opposes redistribution.
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Perceived benefits from poverty reduction could, for instance, be based on
altruism or group loyalty (Luttmer 2001) or on the crime reducing eﬀect of
poverty reduction (Pauly 1973, Piven and Cloward 1971).2
In this paper we highlight an additional, intra-generational dimension
along which redistributional preferences can diﬀer. This dimension can mod-
erate or even reverse the relationship between own income expectations and
preferences for future redistributional taxation, even though it is based purely
on narrowly defined selfish behavior. Future redistributional taxation aﬀects
the choice of whether to invest in human capital. In turn, redistributional
taxation aﬀects the scarcity rents of human capital. We characterize con-
ditions where individuals, who perceive their own talent as high and are
therefore likely to benefit greatly from human capital investment, may pre-
fer even more redistribution than those who are less confident about their
talent.3
We consider a large set of individuals who are all symmetric ex ante, ex-
cept for their beliefs about what they can gain from investing in education.
Some individuals expect to be able to gain little. Some individuals have inter-
mediate expectations about what they can gain, and, finally, some individuals
expect to earn a high education premium. In line with the large and growing
literature in economics that draws on empirical observations from psychol-
ogy about perception biases regarding own ability, we could also assume that
these diﬀerences are simply based on diﬀerent ‘psychological biases’. Accord-
ingly, the three groups may be called ‘underconfident’, ‘adequately confident’
and ‘overconfident’, respectively. For our results it does not matter if these
diﬀerences in expected education premiums are ‘true’ in the sense that they
are based on heterogenous, but true perceptions about own ability, or are
caused by perception biases.
For a given cost of investment in education, the investment incentives of
the three types of individual will be diﬀerent, and they may also diﬀer in their
2A policy of public enforcement of redistribution is typically derived from these motiva-
tions in order to overcome the free-rider problem that emerges in the context of voluntary
redistribution among the group of well-oﬀ who may all benefit if the poor receive more
support that has been highlighted by Hochman and Rogers (1974).
3Insurance aspects of redistributive taxation (e.g., Varian 1980, Sinn 1996) and other
means that make the wage distribution more egalitarian (see, e.g., Agell and Lommerud
1992 for an analysis of wage compression) have received considerable attention. We will
assume risk neutral individuals throughout, in order to isolate and highlight the eﬀects we
consider.
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preferences for income redistribution. Those who expect higher own returns
from education investment will be more likely to invest in education and this
is unsurprising. However, the redistributional preferences can be surprising.
We show that the individuals who are highly confident may prefer more
redistribution than the individuals who are less confident or even have no
confidence at all.4
The intuitive reason is as follows. The less confident individuals are un-
likely to invest in education and will not pay the tax on the education pre-
mium. They would like to maximize the per capita net transfers to the
individuals who do not invest in education, and, in this respect, they face a
Laﬀer type trade-oﬀ: a higher tax reduces the tax base. The highly confident
individuals collectively may want to exclude others from acquiring education,
because the smaller the set of highly educated persons, the higher their skill
premium. Hence, the highly confident also face a trade-oﬀ: the higher the
tax they have to pay, the larger the skill premium they can obtain. Which of
the most preferred taxes of the two groups is the higher is unclear, as they
optimize along diﬀerent trade-oﬀs.5
For our analysis it does not matter whether education investment endows
individuals with skills that improve their productivity in the labor market
as is predominantly assumed in the human capital theory (Becker 1962), or
whether the productivity increase is the result of education as a filter and
assignment process, as has been discussed by Arrow (1973).
In the theoretical analysis we assume that all individuals diﬀer only in
their perceptions about their own ability. We need not discriminate between
whether these perceptions are based on true diﬀerences or simply misper-
ceptions. Indeed, confidence biases, and overconfidence in particular, are
documented in the psychology literature.6 For the purpose of our analysis,
4A possible candidate for explaining such preferences in a theoretical analysis is risk
aversion. As is known from Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985), self-insurance and self-
protection have non-trivial and partially paradoxical comparative statics. But this ex-
planation is not at work in our framework as we consider risk neutral agents.
5Alternative tools may come to mind when we think about how to increase scarcity rents
for human capital. Note, however, that the group of individuals under consideration cannot
simply erect more classical barriers to entry such as admission rules that are guarded by
professional associations. Such classical barriers make sense only for individuals who are
already "inside" and have passed the barriers that are to be erected, whereas, prior to the
education choice, the individuals who express their redistributional preferences are still
themselves "outside".
6The most relevant evidence in this context is the “better than average” eﬀect that has
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we adopt the notion of being ‘highly confident’, ‘just confident’ and ‘lowly
confident’.
This irrelevance regarding the causes of diﬀerences in confidence is also
important when turning to the data. Individuals’ perceptions matter for
their career decisions, regardless of where these perceptions come from and
whether they are correct or not. Accordingly, those who expect to earn higher
education premiums will self-select into education programmes, whether they
are overly optimistic about their abilities or are simply really better than av-
erage. Hence, the education choice can be seen as a proxy for confidence
as regards own benefits from the education investment, i.e., for high confi-
dence, and when we analyse survey data on redistributional preferences, the
education choice is our proxy for confidence.
2 Taxation and education choices
Let there be a continuum of individuals i, with i ∈ [0, 1]. Each individual
can abstain from trying to become productive and receive a wage that is
normalized to zero. Alternatively, the person can invest in education. The
cost of investment is e. This can be thought of as the opportunity cost of
time or inconvenience, but it is expressed in terms of its equivalent monetary
income such that e and monetary income can simply be added.
Educated individuals will earn a wage premium w, which is defined as
w = (a− γb)θ. (1)
Consider the components of w in (1). First, θ is a random variable that
reflects the individuals’ confidence in their education productivity. Individ-
uals know that their own productivity is a random variable, and we denote
individual i’s perceived expected productivity as Eθi. Individuals diﬀer in
their perceptions, reflecting objective diﬀerences, or psychological biases.
For concreteness, we focus on a simple distribution of expectations in
which the individuals are allocated among three groups: A0 is the group of
been documented, e.g., by Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich (2001) with respect to judges’
assessments of their decisions, or by Svenson (1981) with respect to driving skills. Further
references can be found, for instance, in Squintani (1999) and Heifetz and Spiegel (2000).
Relevant papers considering the relationship between confidence and dynamic education
filters are Squintani (1999) and Flåm and Risa (2003). This literature is silent with regard
to redistributive taxation.
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individuals who have “high confidence”, individuals in A1 have “intermediate
or just confidence”, and individuals in A2 have “low confidence”. These are
characterized by the following expected values:
Eθi = h > 1, for i ∈ A0
Eθi = 1, for i ∈ A1
Eθi = 0, for i ∈ A2.
(2)
Without loss of generality we can consider the individuals numbered and
sorted so that the set of highly confident A0 = [0, α0], the set of just confident
A1 = (α0, α0 + α1], and the set of individuals with low confidence, A2 =
(α0+α1, 1]. This exhausts the set [0, 1] of all individuals and also determines
the relative size α0, α1 and 1− α0 − α1 of these groups.
Note that, where individuals’ perceptions are not correct but are biased
with respect to their own ability, individuals have correct beliefs about the
distribution of perceptions of confidence etc.
Second, a and b in (1) are positive and exogenous parameters, and γ ∈
[0, 1] is the share of individuals who invest in education. The expected wage
premium is a linear, declining function of the share of educated individuals,
and shows that the marginal product of human capital should be declining
in the amount of the human capital that is available in the economy. We
assume that
a− (α0 + α1)b− e > 0. (3)
This implies that education investment is desirable in the absence of taxes
at least for all individuals i with Eθi ≥ 1 and rules out some uninteresting
corner solutions.
A tax t will be chosen that is paid by all individuals who have invested in
education, and, hence, earn the education premium (1). Taxes are redistrib-
uted on a lump-sum basis, similar to the classical analysis of redistributive
taxation in Meltzer and Richard (1981). Accordingly, the government bud-
get constraint requires that the transfer payment to each individual is equal
to γt. In a more narrow interpretation, t could also be seen as tuition fees.
However, we follow the more general interpretation of a less specific tax in
what follows.
Individuals’ perceived payoﬀs depend on their own education choice, the
education choices of others, the size of the tax, and their own level of confi-
dence. For simplicity, individuals will be risk neutral. The perceived payoﬀ
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of an individual who invests in education is
πi(t, e) = Eθi(a− γb)− (1− γ)t− e. (4)
The expected payoﬀ for an individual who does not invest in education and
hence, does not earn an education premium is equal to
πi(t, 0) ≡ γt. (5)
In what follows we characterize the investment choices for diﬀerent levels of
taxes, and concentrate on pure strategy equilibria only.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium share of individuals investing in education
is uniquely determined for all t ≥ 0. The equilibrium share is
γ(t) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
α0 + α1 if t ∈ [0, a− (α0 + α1)b− e] ≡ T1
a−e−t
b if t ∈ (a− (α0 + α1)b− e, a− α0b− e) ≡ T2
α0 if t ∈ [a− α0b− e, ha− α0hb− e] ≡ T3
ah−e−t
bh if t ∈ [ha− α0hb− e, ha− e) ≡ T4
0 if t ∈ [ha− e,∞) ≡ T5
(6)
Proof. For their investment decision, individuals i compare their payoﬀ
πi(t, e) from investing with their payoﬀ πi(t, 0) from not investing, and these
values depend on the share γ of other individuals who invest in education.
All i ∈ A2 never invest in education, regardless of what any other indi-
vidual does, as πi(t, e) = −e− (1− γ)t < γt for any tax t ≥ 0 and any share
γ ≥ 0.
Consider i ∈ A0 ∪ A1. For any γ, πi(t, 0) = γt for both i ∈ A0 and
i ∈ A1, whereas πi(t, e) > πj(t, e) if i ∈ A0 and j ∈ A1. Accordingly, all
highly confident individuals invest if at least some just confident individuals
invest, and none of the just confident individuals invests if at least some of
the highly confident individuals abstain from investing.
Consider a tax t ∈ T1 = [0, a−(α0+α1)b−e]. Individuals i ∈ A1 invest if
πi(t, e) > πi(t, 0), which can be written equivalently as a−γb−e−t > 0. For
all γ ≤ α0 + α1 this inequality is fulfilled for all t ∈ T1. All individuals from
A1 and, a fortiori, all individuals from A0 invest, and this yields γ = α0+α1
as the unique equilibrium share γ(t) for i ∈ T1.
Consider a tax t ∈ T2 = (a− (α0 + α1)b− e, a− α0b− e). Note that
γ(t) =
a− e− t
b
(7)
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is an equilibrium share for t ∈ T2. All i ∈ A0 strictly prefer to invest if they
believe that the share of other individuals who invest is equal to γ(t) as in
(7) as they prefer to invest if ha−γhb− e− t > 0, and inserting (7) into this
condition yields (h − 1)(e + t) > 0, which is fulfilled as h > 1. All i ∈ A1
are just indiﬀerent whether to invest; this can be confirmed by inserting (7)
into the indiﬀerence condition a− γb− e− t = 0. Hence, a measure equal to
γ−α0 of individuals from A1 may invest, making the belief (7) just fulfilled.
There are uncountably many combinations of investment choices of indi-
viduals from A1 that yield (7). However, the share (7) is the unique equilib-
rium share for t ∈ T2. Suppose there is a second equilibrium share γˆ 6= a−e−tb .
Note that it must hold that γˆ ∈ [0, α0 + α1]. Note further that for t ∈ T2,
ha− γhb− e− t > 0 is fulfilled for all γˆ ∈ [0, α0+α1]. Hence, all individuals
i ∈ A0 invest. Therefore, γˆ ∈ [α0, α0 + α1]. If γˆ ∈ (α0, α0 + α1), then this
requires that all i ∈ A1 must be just indiﬀerent about whether to invest. But
the indiﬀerence condition for them is a− γb− e− t = 0 and has one unique
solution which is (7). It remains to show that γˆ = α0 and γˆ = α0 + α1 are
not equilibrium shares. For γˆ = α0, all individuals i ∈ A0∪A1 strictly prefer
to invest, leading to a share of individuals who invest equal to α0+α1 6= α0,
hence, a contradiction. For γˆ = α0 + α1 only i ∈ A0 prefer to invest, all
i ∈ A0 prefer not to invest. This yields a group of individuals who invest
which constitutes a share γ = α0 6= α0 + α1, and, hence, a contradiction.
Consider now taxes in the interval T3 = [a − α0b − e, ha − α0hb − e].
Individuals i ∈A1 invest (and i ∈ A0 invest a fortiori then) if a−γb−e−t > 0.
For t > a−α0b− e this inequality cannot be fulfilled for any γ > α0. Hence,
for taxes t > a−α0b−e, it cannot be optimal for i ∈ A1 to invest in education.
Consider then i ∈ A0. They prefer to invest if ha−γhb−e−t > 0. Note that
this inequality is strictly fulfilled for all t ∈ T3\{ha−α0hb−e} for all γ ≤ α0,
implying that γ = α0 is the only belief that is consistent with equilibrium
behavior. Finally, for t = ha− α0hb− e , the condition ha− γhb− e− t > 0
is fulfilled for all γ < α0, implying that γ = α0 is the only equilibrium belief
for this tax as well.
Consider now taxes in the interval T4 = [ha−α0hb−e, ha−e). Such high
taxes are not compatible with γ > α0, implying that only individuals with
high confidence may invest. Individuals i ∈ A0 invest if ha−γhb− e− t ≥ 0.
However, ha− α0hb− e− t < 0, implying that less than all highly confident
individuals invest in the equilibrium. Note that
γ(t) =
ah− e− t
bh
(8)
7
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
(t)γ
t* = a - e - b( α0+α1 )
t0
1
t** = a - e - bα0
t*** = ha - e - hbα0
t**** = ha - e
0 + 1αα
0α
Figure 1: The equilibrium relationship between t and the share γ(t) of indi-
viduals who invest in education.
is the unique solution to the indiﬀerence condition ha− γhb− e− t = 0. For
this, and only for this γ, all individuals from A0 are indiﬀerent to whether
to invest.
Finally, consider the interval T5 = [ha−e,∞). In this interval, ha−γhb−
e− t < 0 even for the smallest feasible γ ≥ 0. All individuals prefer not to
invest and γ = 0 is the only equilibrium belief.
The equilibrium relationship between t and the share γ(t) of individuals
who invest in education.The equilibrium relationship between t and the share
γ(t) of individuals who invest in education.
The function γ(t) is displayed in Figure 1, and its curvature is intuitively
plausible. A very low tax will not prevent individuals who expect to gain
a premium from investing in education that strictly exceeds their education
cost, and the higher the tax on the education premium, the smaller the group
of individuals who decide to invest. For a suﬃciently high tax all individuals
prefer not to invest. The steps in the function γ(t) result from the jumps in
confidence levels Eθi between the three types of individuals considered.
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3 Tax preferences
For the discussion of tax preferences it is useful to define some of the limits
of the tax intervals in proposition 1 explicitly. The highest tax rate at which
all individuals except individuals with very little confidence invest is
t∗ ≡ a− (α0 + α1)b− e. (9)
For higher tax rates, some just confident individuals do not invest. In this
range, the relationship between t and γ in the equilibrium is described by (7).
Once the tax rate is suﬃciently high, all just confident individuals decide not
to invest and only the highly confident individuals invest. The smallest tax
rate for which this is true is
t∗∗ ≡ a− α0b− e. (10)
The largest tax rate for which this is true is
t∗∗∗ ≡ ha− hα0b− e. (11)
For higher tax rates in the range T4, only some of the highly confident indi-
viduals invest and the relationship between t and γ is described by (8). From
a certain tax rate onwards, however, no single individual will invest. This
critical tax rate is
t∗∗∗∗ ≡ ha− e.
For the analysis that follows we make the following assumption that is an
implicit assumption about the elasticity of the tax base:
b < min
½
a− e
2(α0 + α1)
, ha− e
2hα0
¾
. (12)
Condition (12) implies that γ(t)t is non-increasing in t both for t ∈ T2 and
t ∈ T4. This makes it easier to single out the most preferred tax rates from
the perspective of individuals from the sets A0, A1 and A2. It will turn out
that we can concentrate on comparing preferences about the tax rates t∗, t∗∗
and t∗∗∗.
Proposition 2 The tax rate that is most preferred by individuals from group
A2 is t∗ or t∗∗∗. They strictly prefer t∗ to t∗∗∗ if
(a− (α0 + α1)b− e)(α0 + α1) > (ha− hα0b− e)α0 (13)
and t∗∗∗ to t∗ if the reverse inequality holds.
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Proof. Individuals i ∈ A2 choose t that maximizes γ(t)t. This maximum
is in the range [t∗, t∗∗∗∗] as γ(t)t is strictly monotonically increasing in t for
t < t∗ and γ(t)t = 0 for all t ≥ t∗∗∗∗. The elasticity condition (12) further
simplifies the problem, as b < a−e
2(α0+α1) implies that
d(γ(t)t)
dt < 0 in the range
t ∈ T2, and b < ha−e2hα0 implies that
d(γ(t)t)
dt < 0 in the range t ∈ T4. Hence,
the maximum for γ(t)t is reached for t∗ or t∗∗∗. Inserting (9) and (11) yields
γ(t∗)t∗ > γ(t∗∗∗)t∗∗∗ if and only if (13) holds.
Intuitively, the individuals with little confidence would like to maximize
redistributed tax revenue as this is redistributed on a per capita basis. They
face the usual Laﬀer-curve problem: a larger tax rate will reduce the tax base,
because fewer of the more confident individuals invest. Given that the tax
revenue is declining in the interior of T2 and T4, the tax revenue curve γ(t)t
peaks either at t∗ or at t∗∗∗, and condition (13) discriminates between these
two cases.
We now turn to the just confident group of individuals.
Proposition 3 The tax rate that is most preferred by individuals from group
A1 is t = 0 or t∗∗∗. They strictly prefer t = 0 if and only if
a− (α0 + α1)b− e > (ha− hα0b− e)α0 (14)
and t∗∗∗ if the reverse inequality holds.
Proof. For t > t∗∗, individuals i ∈ A1 do not invest, and their pay-
oﬀ for this range of taxes is γ(t)t. By (12) γ(t)t is monotonically de-
creasing in t for t ∈ T4 and constant and equal to zero for even higher
t. Moreover, γ(t)t is monotonically increasing in t for t ∈ T3. Hence,
t∗∗∗ = argmaxt∈T3∪T4∪T5[γ(t)t].
For t ∈ T1, individuals i ∈ A1 strictly prefer to invest in education. Their
payoﬀ is (a− (α0 + α1)b− e)− (1− (α0 + α1))t and strictly decreases in t.
For t ∈ T2, individuals are indiﬀerent to whether to invest or not to invest.
Accordingly, their payoﬀ equals γ(t)t, and by (12) it decreases in t in this
interval. Finally, the payoﬀ is a continuous function of t at t∗. This shows
that the just confident individuals strictly prefer t = 0 among all t ∈ T1∪T2.
Whether i ∈ A1 prefers t = 0 or t = t∗∗∗, the equilibrium payoﬀ for
individuals i ∈ A1 for these taxes needs to be compared. The left-hand side
in (14) is the payoﬀ from t = 0 and the right-hand side of (14) is the payoﬀ
from t = t∗∗∗.
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Consider finally i ∈ A0. The following proposition holds for the group of
individuals with high confidence:
Proposition 4 The tax rate that is most preferred by individuals from group
A0 is t = 0 or some t ∈ T2 with t > t∗. Their most preferred tax is t = t∗∗ if
h >
a− e
b
− 2α0 + 1 (15)
and
(ha− hα0b− e)− (1− α0)[a− α0b− e] > ha− h(α0 + α1)b− e. (16)
Proof. The perceived payoﬀ of a highly confident individual frommaking
the individually optimal choice to invest or not to invest is
(ha− hγ(t)b− e)− (1− γ(t))t for t ∈ T1 ∪ T3 ∪ T3
γ(t)t for t ∈ T4 ∪ T5.
(17)
For t ∈ T1, the equilibrium γ(t) = const. with respect to a small increase in t,
and, hence, the payoﬀ of the highly confident individuals (17) decreases in t
for t ∈ T1. All i ∈ A0 strictly prefer t = 0 to t = t∗. Also, for t ∈ T3, a similar
argument applies, and t = t∗∗ is strictly preferred to t = t∗∗∗. For t ∈ T4∪T5,
all i ∈ A0 in the equilibrium weakly or strictly prefer not to invest. Their
perceived payoﬀ is therefore equal to γ(t)t in this range, and, by b < ha−e
2hα0
from condition (12), γ(t)t is decreasing in t for t ∈ T4 and constant (and
equal to zero) for t ∈ T5. Among all t ∈ T3 ∪ T4 ∪ T5, they strictly prefer
t∗∗. All this together implies that the perceived payoﬀ of i ∈ A0 must take
its maximum on t = 0 or on some t ∈ [t∗ +∆, t∗∗], for some strictly positive
∆, hence, for a tax that is strictly higher than t∗. This shows the first part
of proposition 4.
In the range t ∈ T2 an increase in t increases the perceived gross income
for i ∈ A0 by ∂(Eθi(a−γ(t)b)−e)∂t = h, and it increases the individual’s tax (net of
transfers received) by ∂[1−γ(t))t]∂t =
2t−a+e
b + 1. Accordingly, a corner solution
at t = t∗∗ is obtained if h − 2(a−α0b−e)−a+eb − 1 ≥ 0, which condition can
be written equivalently as (15). The condition (16) compares the perceived
payoﬀ at this tax t∗∗ with the perceived payoﬀ for t = 0.
Propositions 2, 3 and 4 characterize the tax rates that members of the
respective groups prefer most. It seems to be plausible that members of the
group A2 who never invest in education, never pay the tax and simply receive
redistributions from the total tax revenue prefer higher tax rates than other
confidence types. However, this is not generally the case:
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Figure 2: The most confident prefer t∗∗, the just confident prefer t = 0 and
the invididuals with low confidence prefer t∗ with 0 < t∗ < t∗∗ in the shaded
area which is drawn for α0 → 0 and α1 = 0.75.
Proposition 5 If the set A0 is suﬃciently small then i ∈ A1 prefer the
lowest tax rate t = 0, i ∈ A2 most prefer t∗, and i ∈ A0 most prefer a tax
rate that may exceed the tax t∗. Their most preferred tax is t∗∗ if h−1 > a−eb
and hα1 > a−eb hold.
Proof. For a proof, consider α0 → 0.
For α0 = 0, condition (13) becomes 0 < a− α1b− e, which is fulfilled by
(3). Hence, by proposition 2, t∗ is the most preferred tax for i ∈ A2.
For α0 = 0, condition (14) reduces to the same condition 0 < a−α1b− e.
Hence, by proposition 3, t = 0 is the most preferred tax for i ∈ A1.
For α0 = 0, for i ∈ A0, the conditions (15) and (16) reduce to h > a−eb +1
and hα1 > a−eb .
Proposition 5 shows that the individuals with high confidence who will
invest in education and pay the tax may favor a higher tax than the just
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confident or even the individuals who have low confidence and who never
pay this tax but receive redistributions from it. It is important to notice
that this range is non-empty. This is illustrated in Figure 2. The shaded
area defines such a parameter range of h and (a− e)/b. Conditions (3), (12),
(13), (14), (15) and (16) must hold. For α0 → 0, (3), (13) and (14) reduce
to a−eb > α1. The first condition in (12) reduces to
a−e
b > 2α1, hence, a
strightly tighter condition. The second condition in (12) is trivially fulfilled
for α0 → 0. Condition (15) reduces to a−eb < h− 1, and (16) to
a−e
b < α1h.
The intuition for the result is perhaps more straightforward than the
calculations that lead to proposition 5. Individuals with little confidence
who never invest in education would like to maximize the total tax revenue
that can be redistributed, because this maximizes the transfers they receive.
As is well known from standard Laﬀer curve arguments, the tax revenue
is not maximized for the maximum tax that is feasible. People with high
confidence are guided by a diﬀerent consideration. They know they will invest
in education and expect a high wage premium from education. This premium
will be higher, the smaller the number of other individuals who invest in
education, as scarcity of human capital will drive up the wage premium
from education. For this reason, they are willing to accept a considerable
tax if this tax prevents a suﬃciently large number of other individuals from
investing in education, such that the increase in their expected gross wage
premium from deterring others from investing in education exceeds their
additional cost of tax payments required to make this deterrence eﬀective.
Proposition 5, together with Figure 2, illustrates that this can really be the
case and the analysis suggests that the full eﬀect is more likely to be at work
if individuals with high confidence are very confident, and if their number is
small in comparison to the number of individuals who have an intermediate
confidence level.
Proposition 5 is a possibility result only, and, in its extreme format, it
might perhaps be considered as less plausible. However, the result highlights
a general and important eﬀect that applies even if the counterintuitive result
of proposition 5 does not apply in a strict sense. High taxes on an education
premium are less painful for those who invest in education, as there is a
counterbalancing eﬀect. The higher tax reduces education investment and
this drives up the scarcity rents for those who invest. This counterbalancing
eﬀect may reduce the resistance to higher taxes even among those who invest
in education and pay these taxes. From this perspective, proposition 5 mainly
states that this counterbalancing eﬀect can be very strong, indeed.
13
4 The data and the empirical strategy
In this section we turn to the empirical relationship between perceptions
about own ability and redistributional preferences. We use a data set that
has been obtained from a survey of 2000 individuals that Thomas Piketty
conducted in France in 1998 with financial support from the McArthur Foun-
dation.7 The data set contains 65 variables and includes income, many socio-
demographic characteristics and answers to questions on social, political,
ethical, and cultural issues.
In line with the theoretical analysis in sections 2 and 3 that considers
individuals who choose their human capital investment and do not yet know
whether their own investment will be successful, we consider only individuals
aged 18-25. This reduces the size of the sub-sample used to 321 observations.
The endogenous variable to be explained is preferences for redistribu-
tive taxation, or the desire for redistribution. The data set provides several
measures for an individual’s preferences with regard to income redistribution.
We concentrate on the following three questions to construct the variables we
use. The first variable is the respondents’ answer to the question “According
to you, taxes should be increased or not?” (dumimp). The second and third
variables are constructed from two questions regarding the monthly wage of
a shopkeeper. One question is “According to you, what should the average
monthly wage of a shopkeeper be?” (revsouhcaiss) and the other is “Accord-
ing to you, what is the average monthly wage of a shopkeeper?” (revcaiss).
The answers to these questions were used by Piketty (1999) to construct
an indirect measure of the desired redistribution. More precisely, we have
used the answer to the question “what should be. . . ” (revsouhcaiss) and
the variable (revmoy) concerning the respondent’s beliefs about the average
household income. We do this in order to control for the possible diﬀerences
in individuals’ perception of average incomes in the population. An alterna-
tive to this procedure has been to construct a new variable (diﬀrevsoucaiss)
as the ratio: [revsouhcaiss] / [revcaiss]. This ratio solves the problem of con-
trolling for the heterogeneity of the beliefs on the average household income
level in a direct way.
We also conducted some estimates using other variables, e.g. opinrmi,
defined as the answer to “According to you, the RMI (minimum income)
should be increased, maintained, decreased, suppressed?”, that look attrac-
7For a detailed description see Piketty (1999).
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tive at the first glance. We do not reproduce the estimation results here as
the estimations turned out to be inconclusive.
We need an explanatory variable that measures the respondents’ confi-
dence. For this purpose, we try to correctly identify the group of respondents,
who, for the right or wrong reason, are very confident about their ability to
turn human capital investment into own productivity, and use it to consider
the explanatory power of high confidence for the desire for redistribution.
The data set allows for constructing several variables that can be considered
as proxies for an individual’s own perceptions about talent or the ability to
turn human capital investment into high own productivity.
We constructed several variables to measure confidence and report re-
sults only on the following four. The first measure of confidence is based
on the idea that highly confident individuals should self-select and choose
to become students. Hence, we chose a dummy variable (dumstud) which
takes value 1 if the respondent is a student, and zero otherwise. The second
measure of confidence uses the questions concerning the perceived determi-
nants of own professional success: the respondent has been asked whether
he/she thinks that success depends on eﬀort or, alternatively, on uncontro-
lable events. Based on this question, we define the dummy explicreuss2 that
is 1 if the respondent believes in eﬀort as the determinant of individual suc-
cess and 0 otherwise. The dummy overconf1 is constructed by multiplying
dumstud and explicreuss2. It captures the following condition of perceived
high ability: student and believing in eﬀort as the determinant of own suc-
cess. The third measure of confidence uses respondents’ answers with regard
to their future prospects (how things will be in the next 5 years). The re-
spective dummy variable is opin5ans2 and takes on the value 1 if the answer
is “better than now” and 0 if the answer is “similar to or worse than now”.
Using this dummy, we construct the dummy (overconf2): student with posi-
tive/very positive future prospects. The fourth definition of high confidence
captures the students with positive future prospects who, in addition, believe
in eﬀort as the reason for success (as in definition 2). To build the corre-
sponding dummy (overconﬀutur), taking values 0 and 1, we simply multiply
the dummies dumstud, opin5ans and explicreuss2.
Our empirical strategy is to test for the explanatory power of diﬀerent
definitions of confidence for the preference for redistribution. The empirical
relationship or reduced form model is as follows: the desire for redistribu-
tive taxation (or, alternatively, the intensity of redistribution preferences)
is explained as a function of dummies that capture perceived own ability
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and other variables such as income and further socio-demographic variables.
We use the measures of redistributional preferences discussed above as the
endogenous variables, the various measures of confidence as an explanatory
variable, and use income, socio-demographic variables (age, gender, size of
the area where the respondent lives, profession of the parents, etc.) as further
controls.
In order to adjust a model for dumimp, given the binary nature of the
variable, we estimate a discrete choice model (a probit in our case). When
the endogenous variable was the question “what should the monthly wage
be...” or the ratio diﬀrevsoucaiss we use an OLS regression.
In general, the estimations suﬀered from the small size of the sub-sample
we used. In particular, the number of observations which have a “1” for
the variables constructed in a more sophisticated way is small (see Table
1). Some of the empirical models we have estimated failed to pass the tests
of robustness. In particular, in the case of the discrete choice models, we
eliminated all the estimations with a predictive power lower than 80% (i.e.
the percentage of correctly predicted 1 and 0 was lower than 0.8). Table 1
provides definitions of variables. In tables 2, 3 and 4, we present a selection of
results that, in our opinion, are relevant from an econometric point of view.
Also, we report only the variables and their respective coeﬃcients if the level
of significance is above 90 percent. In table 2 the dependent variable is the
dummy about tax preferences (dumimp). In table 3 the endogenous variable
is diﬀrevsoucaiss, the relation between the desired and estimated monthly
wage of a shopkeeper as discussed above. Finally, in table 4, we use the
question about shopkeeper monthly income (i.e: what should the monthly
income of a shopkeeper be?) as a measure of attitude toward inequality.
The coeﬃcient of the income variable revfoy2 is negative and significant
in all these estimations. This result is in line with the related previous em-
pirical findings and with economic intuition according to which low income
earners expect to benefit from redistribution. More surprisingly, in some
cases, we find that the measure of perceived own high ability is positively
correlated with the intensity of the taste for redistribution. This is particu-
larly true in the case of the first definition of perceived own high ability in
which, independently of the measure of the redistributive preferences used,
the coeﬃcient of the dummy that captures high ability (dumstud) is always
positive and significant (at the 10 percent level), as reported in the first set of
regressions in each table. This is in line with the view that individuals who
perceive their own ability as high and, hence, self select to become students,
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may favor more redistribution.
However, we are very reluctant to draw any general conclusions. The em-
pirical results are not very robust, the theoretical relation between confidence
and redistributional preferences has been shown to depend on distributional
parameters that have no counterpart in the empirical estimation, and the
qualitatively unambiguous empirical results can be assigned to a number of
theoretical considerations. For instance, when we change the definition of
the respondent’s perception of own ability, the coeﬃcients of the correspond-
ing dummies are not significant (see the second set of results in table 2 and
all the other regressions of table 4). Still, dumstud remains significant and
with a positive sign: the probability of having high redistributive preferences
is positively aﬀected by the choice of being a student. Moreover, using the
ratio diﬀrevsouhcaiss as a measure of redistributive preference and the sta-
tus student and believing in eﬀort as the definition of perceptions of high
own ability (second set of regressions in table 3), we get that the coeﬃcient
of dumstud still remain positive and significant but, the coeﬃcient of the
dummy overconf1 appears to be significant and negative.
To conclude, the relationship between perceived own ability and prefer-
ences for income redistribution is not straightforward, but we could show
that the two variables are not necessarily negatively correlated.
5 Conclusions
Individuals who perceive their own talent to be very high may favor a high
income tax as a barrier to entry that prevents those individuals investing in
education, who perceive their own ability to be less high. The tax reduces the
share of individuals who invest in human capital and increases the scarcity
rent that accrues to those individuals who invest. We showed that this eﬀect
can, but need not, dominate its cost in terms of the high taxes to be paid
that comes along with this policy. As a result, individuals who are very
confident about their own ability may prefer taxes that are even higher than
those wanted by people who benefit from the increased redistribution that is
financed by these taxes. The empirical implication of the result is that highly
confident individuals should articulate a preference for more redistribution.
We cannot test a very specific hypothesis in the empirical analysis, but we
do find evidence that, for this or other reasons, is in line with the theoretical
results. Overall the result can be interpreted as showing that there is no
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general conflict between the poor and uneducated on the one side and the
rich and educated on the other, with the former asking for more redistribution
and the latter for less, but that there are forces that can make the opposite
redistributional preferences possible.
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Table 1.  Description of the variables used and his label. 
 
Dumimp Dummy: 1 if the individual wants more taxes; 0 otherwise Nº of 0 : 184 ; Nº of 1: 137  
Dumstud Dummy: 1 if student; 0 otherwise Nº of 0 : 192 ; Nº of 1: 129 
Revfoy2 Income of the household in which the individual lives (in annual French francs) Mean = 134903 ; standard dev. = 97364 
Profpere2 Father’s profession (4 types): 1 (self employed), 2 (white collar), 3 (blue collar), 4 (pensioner) Nº of 1 : 82 ; Nº of 2: 45; Nº of 3 : 151 ; Nº of 4: 43 
Profmere2 Mother’s profession (4 types): 1 (self employed), 2 (white collar), 3 (blue collar), 4 (pensioner) Nº of 1 : 31 ; Nº of 2: 48; Nº of 3 : 229 ; Nº of 4: 13 
Sex 1 if boy, 2 if girl Nº of 1 : 143 ; Nº of 2: 178 
Age Age Mean = 21.6 ; standard dev. = 2.3 
Opinrmi2 Answer about the RMI: the RMI (minimum income) should be increased (4), maintained (3), 
decreased (2), suppressed (1) 
Nº of 1 : 13 ; Nº of 2: 8; Nº of 3 : 99 ; Nº of 4: 197  
Agglo2 Size of agglomeration in which the respondent lives (in increasing categories):  
1 (less than 50.000 inhabitants); 2 (between 50 000 and 200.000); 3 (more than 200.000) 
Nº of 1 : 139 ; Nº of 2: 43; Nº of 3 : 139 
Revsouhcaiss Desired (by the respondent) monthly income of a shopkeeper (French Francs) Mean = 7255 ; standard dev. = 1554 
Revcaiss Estimated (by the respondent) monthly income of a shopkeeper (French Francs) Mean = 5755; standard dev. = 992 
Revmoy Estimated (by the respondent) average monthly household income (French Francs) Mean = 10123; standard dev. = 4342 
Diffrevsocaiss Revsouhcaiss/revcaiss Mean = 1.26 ; standard dev. = 0.22 
Explicreuss2 Dummy; 1 if respondent believes in effort as the main determinant of individual success;  
0 if he/she believes in other incontrollable factors 
Nº of 0 : 233 ; Nº of 1: 88 
Overconf1 Explicreuss2*dumstud Nº of 0 : 288 ; Nº of 1: 33 
Opin5ans2 Dummy: 1 if respondent thinks that in the next 5 years own economic conditions will be better 
then they are now; 0 otherwise 
Nº of 0 : 149 ; Nº of 1: 172 
Overconf2 Opin5ans2*dumstud Nº of 0 : 262 ; Nº of 1: 59 
Overconffutur 
(overconfid-r) 
Opin5ans2*dumstud*explicreuss2 Nº of 0 : 304 ; Nº of 1: 17 
 
 
Table 2.  Measure of attitude toward inequality: question about taxes (dumimp).  
Probit, dependent variable: dumimp (1 if more taxes, 0 otherwise). 
 
definition of  
high confidence age 18-25 and student age 18-25, student believing in effort 
 Coef. Std. Err. P > z Coef. Std. Err. P > z 
revfoy2 -1.76E-06 9.02E-07 0.052 -1.78E-06 9.09E-07 0.000 
dumstud 0.3741264 0.2131325 0.079 0.398167 0.2397785 0.097 
explicreuss2    -0.0898737 0.2265374 0.692 
overconf1    -0.1004084 0.3740957 0.788 
age 0.0620315 0.0415555 0.136  0.0607089 0.0419 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Measure of attitude toward inequality: relation between the desired and estimated (by the respondent) monthly wage of a 
shopkeeper (i.e: Which should be the monthly income of a shopkeeper?/ Which is the monthly income of a shopkeeper?).  
Ordinary Least Squares. Dependent variable: diffrevsouhcaiss. 
 
definition of  
high confidence age 18-25 and student age 18-25, student believing in effort 
 Coef. Std. Err. P > z Coef. Std. Err. P > z 
revfoy2 -2.26E-07 1.48E-07 0.128 -2.37E-07 1.43E-07 0.099 
dumstud 0.0661108 0.0372335 0.077 0.0967393 0.0424295 0.024 
explicreuss2    -0.0225034 0.0341603 0.511 
overconf1    -0.11994 0.0584527 0.041 
_Iprofpere-2 0.0754316 0.042328 0.076 0.0700318 0.0409939 0.089 
age 0.017502 0.0066796 0.009 0.016824 0.0064848 0.01 
_cons 0.8683943 0.160896 0 0.8864374 0.1567114 0 
 
Table 4.  Measure of attitude toward inequality: question about shopkeeper monthly income  
(i.e: Which should be the monthly income of a shopkeeper?). OLS. Dependent variable: revsouhcaiss. 
 
definition of 
high confidence age 18-25 and student 
age 18-25,  
student believing in effort 
age 18-25, student and 
positive/very positive on his 
future condition (next 5 years) 
age 18-25, student,  
believing in effort and 
positive/very positive on his 
future condition (next 5 years) 
 Coef. Std. Err. P > z Coef. Std. Err. P > z Coef. Std. Err. P > z Coef. Std. Err. P > z
revmoy 0.071396 0.0189503 0 0.0740287 0.0192782 0 0.0773396 0.018718 0 0.0736915 0.0187817 0
revfoy2 -0.0002895 0.0008303 0.728 -0.0001126 0.0008182 0.891 0.000088 0.0008468 0.917 -0.0006818 0.0008919 0.445
dumstud 672.0402 246.5485 0.007 798.4154 280.2058 0.005 746.3918 321.3293 0.021 723.2077 267.7921 0.007
explicreuss2  -54.41921 237.3512 0.819 -35.812 216.517 0.869
opin5ans2  149.294 212.3613 0.483 170.0322 184.8875 0.359
overconf1  -423.3885 423.2037 0.318
overconf2  -51.33481 378.4187 0.892
overconfid-r  -646.4981 523.4482 0.218
_Iprofpere-2 760.3251 284.3135 0.008 723.0515 283.0438 0.011 677.1683 288.2462 0.02 566.2561 297.6039 0.058
_Iprofmere-4 333.2898 360.4273 0.356 408.1264 356.2426 0.253 645.4761 345.6986 0.063 854.1951 440.9801 0.054
_cons 5006.517 1124.001 0 4766.594 1109.858 0 4429.689 1151.394 0 3977.047 1124.134 0
 
